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The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A
Look at its Development and at How Its
Analysis Under Social Contract Theory
Might Expand Its Scope
JANICE AITKEN"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the United States and the American Indians
is marked by extreme shifts in the policy of the federal government toward
the Indian Nations, from the forcible removal of "hundreds of tribes . . .
from their ancestral lands" to "a commitment... to revive tribal governments."' The history of that relationship developed out of a tension
between the two doctrines that form the basis for the federal-tribal
relationship: the "plenary" power over Indian affairs vested in the federal
government by the United States Constitution2 and "special trust obligations" which impose strict fiduciary standards on the federal government's
dealings with Indians.3
The "trust doctrine" is rooted in Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in
the "Cherokee Cases," Cherokee Nation v. Georgia4 and Worcester v.
Georgia,5 where he described the relation of the Indian tribes to the United

* B.A., Cleveland State University; M.A., Cleveland State University; J.D., Cleveland
Marshall College of Law; Law Clerk to the Honorable Jack B. Streepy, Magistrate Judge in
the Northern District of Ohio.
1. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 49 (1982 ed.).
2. There are three explicit Constitutional references to Indians: the Indian Commerce
Clause, which authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce... with the Indian Tribes," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from population counts taken
for the purpose of apportioning taxes and Congressional representatives, Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3,
amend. XIV, § 2. The Treaty Clause, art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which vests exclusive power to enter
into treaties in the Federal Government, and the Property Clause, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which
vests power "to dispose of and regulate 'the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States"' in Congress, along with art. I, § 8, cl. 18, the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and art. VI, cl. 2, the Supremacy Clause, are additional sources of Federal authority over
Indian affairs. COHEN, supra note 1, at 207-11.
3. COHEN, supra note 1, at 207.
4. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
5. 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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States as resembling "that of a ward to his guardian." This doctrine has
proved to be a two-edged sword. For more than five decades following the
Cherokee Cases, issues regarding the scope and meaning of the trust
doctrine remained dormant.7 Then, for a period of about forty years,
beginning with United States v. Kagama8 and ending with United States v.
Candelaria,9 the trust doctrine was treated as an additional, independent
source of federal power over Indian affairs.' ° During this period, the trust
relationship was used to expand the ability of the Federal Government to
intrude into internal tribal affairs."
Until recently, however, the trust relationship has not been effective as
a limitation on federal power. Early attempts by Indians to seek equitable
relief for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the executive branch often
met with dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity. 2 The Court is now
willing to find that the trust relationship imposes fiduciary duties on the
actions of Executive agencies but remains hesitant to find the same duties
imposed on Congressional action in Indian affairs. 3 While the Supreme
Court appears to have acknowledged a "general trust relationship" between
the Federal Government and the Indians in United States v. Mitchell, 4 the
Court based its finding of a fiduciary duty on a statutorily created comprehensive timber management scheme. The Mitchell II Court also found an
independent basis for the fiduciary duty "when the Government assumes
such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians."'"
If the trust doctrine is to operate as an effective limitation on Federal
power over internal tribal affairs, it must be able to reach Congressional as

6. COHEN, supra note 1, at 220.
7. Reid Peyton Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of the FederalTrust Responsibility
to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1223 (1975).
8. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
9. 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
10. COHEN, supra note 1, at 220.
11. See, e.g., Kagama, 118 U.S. at 283-84 (upholding, on the basis of the guardianward relationship, the Major Crimes Act, which extended Federal Jurisdiction to crimes
committed by Indians against other Indians in Indian Country).
12. See, e.g., Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473 (1906) (dismissinga Constitutional
challenge to a statute authorizing the classification of land ceded to the United States by the
Chippewas as forest land, on grounds that the classification would decrease the value of the
land and thus reduce the size of the Chippewa's trust account and annual sales).
13. Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and The Promise of Native Sovereignty: the
Trust DoctrineRevisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1513-14 (1994).
14. 463 U.S. 206 (1983) ("MitchelllI").
15. Id. at 225, (quoted in Kimberly T. Ellwanger, Money DamagesForBreachof the
Federal-IndianRelationshipAfter
Mitchell II -United States v. Mitchell, 59 WASH L. REV.
675, 685 (1984)).
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well as Executive action. This will require a basis beyond a statutory
scheme or assumption of control over a specific area of Indian activity.
This article will explore the possibility of such a basis. In part I, I look at
the development of the trust doctrine in case law. In part I, I look at how
several commentators view the trust doctrine. In part IV, I will explore the
possibility of developing a broader basis for the trust doctrine based on an
application of social contract theory to the original understanding of the federal-Indian relationship as documented by Chief Justice Marshall in the
Cherokee Cases. I then discuss the implications of the resulting social contract paradigm of the trust doctrine and describe how it should be applied.
H.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE

Authors of legal opinions, treatises, and law review articles generally
cite Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 6 and Worcester v. Georgia,17 commonly
known as the "Cherokee Cases," as the source of the federal trust doctrine
in Federal Indian Law.' In this section of the paper, I first set forth the
reasoning of the Court in these foundational cases. I then discuss the
evolution of the trust doctrine in subsequent Supreme Court cases. Finally,
I discuss how various commentators view the trust doctrine.
A.

THE ACCEPTED FOUNDATION OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE: CHEROKEE
NATION AND WORCESTER

In Cherokee Nation, the Cherokees, identifying themselves as a
"foreign state, not owing allegiance to the United States, nor to any state of
this union, nor to any prince, potentate or state, other than their own,"
sought an injunction against the enforcement of a Georgia state statute
annexing land that came within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation's
territory as established by federal treaty, extending the laws of Georgia over
Cherokee land, and abolishing the laws of the Cherokee Nation." The
Cherokee Nation Court denied the Cherokees' request on the ground that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, because the Cherokee Nation, not
being a foreign nation, lacked standing to bring the cause of action.20
16. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
17. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
18. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); FELIX S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220 (2d. ed., 1932); Gail M. Lambert, Indian Breach
of Trust Suits: PartialJustice in the Court of the Conqueror, 33 RUT. L. REv. 502, 504
(1981).
19. 30 U.S. at 3, 7.
20. Id. at 17. Justice Marshall undertook this inquiry into the status of the Cherokee
Nation because, under Article III of the United States Constitution, which enumerates the
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Justice Marshall, finding that the Cherokee Nation was more properly
described as a "domestic dependant nation" in a "state of pupilage" whose
relationship with the United States resembled that of a "ward to his
guardian," went on to note that the tribes "look to our government for
protection; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as
their great father."'" This language, with its emphasis on the dependant
status of the Cherokees, is supportive of the power side of the trust
equation: power born of paternalism. It developed into the plenary power
doctrine about half a century later in Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock.22
Worcester did not share Cherokee Nation's jurisdictional defect. The
plaintiff in error in Worcester was a white missionary who had been indicted
and convicted in the supreme court for the county of Gwinnett in the state
of Georgia" under a Georgia statute prohibiting whites from "residing
within the limits of the Cherokee Nation without a license."24 As

cases over which the Court has jurisdiction, the Court may hear only cases involving
controversies "between a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects."
Id. at 15. The Cherokee Nation had argued that, as individuals, the Cherokees were aliens
who owed no allegiance to the United States and that a state composed of aliens must be a
foreign state. Id. at 16. Marshall felt that this argument could not be taken at face value
because of the unique relationship between the Indians and the United States. Id. Marshall's
analysis of whether the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state for Article III purposes focused
on the following factors: the "maps, geographical treatises, histories and laws" of the United
States all considered Indian territory to be part of the United States; in their treaties with the
United States, the Cherokees acknowledged that they are under the protection of the United
States and that the United States alone could regulate trade with the Cherokees; that, if any
nation attempted to acquire Indian land or "form apolitical connection" with the Indians, the
United States would view it as an act of hostility; and that framers of the constitution did not
include the Indians among those able to sue in the federal courts but did separately list them
in the Commerce Clause, thus distinguishing them from foreign nations and the states of the
union. 30 U.S. at 17-18. Justices Johnson, Id. at 20-31, and Baldwin, Id. at 31-51,
concurred in the judgment but concluded that the Indians possessed no sovereignty, while
Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Story, dissented, Id. at 50-80, viewing the Cherokees
as a foreign nation.
21. Id. at 17. The Court also noted that, because the idea of appealing to the courts
for redress would not have occurred to Indians at that time, it was understandable that Indians
and Indian tribes were not included in the enumerated parties who might sue in Federal
Courts. Id. at 18. The Court found additional support for its conclusion that the Cherokee
Nation was not a foreign state in art. III, § 8 of the United States Constitution, which clearly
distinguished between foreign nations and Indian tribes. Id.
22. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Lone Wo/fwill be discussed infra at notes 66-67 and
accompanying text.
23. 31 U.S. at 536.
24. 31 U.S. at 529. The Georgia statute at issue here, "an act to prevent the exercise
of assumed and arbitrary power, by all persons, under the pretext of authority from the
Cherokee Indians and their laws, and to prevent white persons from residing within that part
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defendant before the state court, Worcester had pled that the Georgia statute
was "repugnant to the treaties [between the United States and the Cherokee
This plea was
Nation], and unconstitutional and[, therefore,] void"."
overruled by the state court, which convicted and sentenced Worcester;
Worcester appealed to the United States Supreme Court.26 The parties
being properly before the Court, the Court went on to find that the questions
of the validity and construction of the treaties" between the United States
and the Cherokee Nation and of the constitutionality of the Georgia statute
were within the proper jurisdiction of the Court.2"
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the Georgia statutes were
repugnant to the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States and
were, therefore, void.29 His analysis began with a discussion of the history
of the relationship between the Indians and Great Britain which set the stage
for the Cherokee's understanding of the relationship the Hopewell and
Holston treaties forged between the Cherokee Nation and the United
States. a0 He noted that the "settled state of things when the.., revolution
commenced" was based on the British policy that "considered them as a
nation capable of maintaining relations of peace and war; of governing
themselves, under her protection; and [made] treaties with them, the
obligation of which she acknowledged."'" Treaties generally contained an
of the chartered limits of Georgia, occupied by the Cherokee Indians, and to provide a guard
for the protection of the gold mines, and to enforce the laws of the state within the aforesaid
territory" was included among the statutes at issue in Cherokee Nation, all of which were
passed in the same session of the Georgia legislature. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 13.
25. Id. at 536.
26. Id.
27. Two treaties between the United States and the Cherokees had a bearing on this
case: the Treaty of Hopewell signed on November 28, 1785, and the Treaty of Holston,
signed July 2, 1791. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 530.
28. 31 U.S. at 541.
29. Georgia had "repeatedly remonstrated the President" for the failure of the United
States to extinguish Indian title over lands within the territory of Georgia in direct violation
of the conditions of the 1802 act of cession by which Georgia ceded to the United States all
land she had claimed with lay west of a designated line. 31 U.S. at 583, 586-87 (M'Lean,
J., concurring). Georgia felt that the Government's pursuit of its goal of civilizing the
Cherokees had increased the difficulty of extinguishing Indian title. Id. at 587. Justice
M'Lean expressed sympathy with Georgia who "no doubt" enacted the laws at issue "under
a conviction of right" and out of "a sense of wrong" because of the lapse of thirty years
"since the time the federal government engaged to extinguish the Indian title, within the
limits of Georgia." Id. at 595. M'Lean concurred in the judgment, however, because the
Georgia laws under which Worcester was convicted were repugnant to the constitution,
treaties, and laws of the United States. Id. at 596.
30. 31 U.S. at 555.
31. Id. at 548-49.
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acknowledgment that the signatory tribe was "under the protection" of [the
signatory power: Great Britain, another European sovereign, or the United
States] and of no other power."32 The signatory power generally "interposed [their power] to restrain the disorderly and licentious from intrusions
into their country, from encroachments on their lands, and from those acts
of violence which were often attended by reciprocal murder."33 According
to the understanding of both the British government and the Cherokee
Nation, this protection was "an engagement [by the British] to punish
aggressions on" their dependant ally, the Cherokee Nation.34 The Cherokees' understanding of their relationship with Great Britain carried over into
their understanding of the relationship with the United States that was set
forth in the Hopewell and Holston treaties.3"
In his discussion of Article Nine of the Treaty of Hopewell, Justice
Marshall noted that construing the words "the United States, in congress
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade
with the Indians, and managing all their affairs" as "a surrender of selfgovernment" would be "a departure of [the words'] necessary meaning, and
a departure from the construction which has been uniformly put on them." 3 6
Justice Marshall asked:
Is it credible, that they should have considered themselves
a[s] surrendering to the United States the right to dictate
their future cessions, and the terms on which they should
be made? ... It is equally inconceivable that they could
have supposed themselves, by a phrase thus slipped into
an article, on another and most interesting subject, to have
divested themselves of the right of self-government on
subjects not connected with trade.37
This language laid the foundation for the canon of construction that treaties
must be construed as the Indians would have understood them. In fact, the

32. Id. at 551. This language carried over into the treaties between the United States
and the various Indian tribes. See, e.g., Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Oct. 22, 1784, U.S.-Oneidas,
Mohawks, Onindagas, Senecas, Cayuga, Tuscarora, art. 1,IV, WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE
AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES 2268 (1973); Treaty of Fort M'Intosh, Jan. 21,
1785, U.S.-Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa, Ottawa, art. 2, IV, WASHBURN at 2269; Treaty
with the Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, U.S.-Creek, art. II, IV, WASHBURN at 2287; Treaty with the
Kaskaskias, Aug. 12, 1803, U.S.-Kaskaskias, art. II, IV, WASHBURN at 2309.
33. 31 U.S. at 552.
34. Id. at 552.
35. Id. at 555.
36. 31 U.S. at 553-54.
37. Id. at 554.
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Court in Choate v. Trapp,3 traced the "enlarged rules of construction [that]
are adopted in reference to Indian treaties" back to Chief Justice Marshall.39
This understanding carried over to the treaty of Holston, negotiated in
July 1791, when it became apparent that the treaty of Hopewell had failed
to establish a lasting peace.4 ° In his discussion of the treaty of Holston,
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the mutuality of the agreements
reached. 4 ' He concluded that the treaty of Holston "explicitly recogniz[ed]
the national character of the Cherokees, and their right to self government."4' 2 Additionally, Chief Justice Marshall noted that a 1819 Congressional Act promoting "humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians
... avowedly contemplate[d] the preservation of the Indian nations as an
object sought by the United States."' 3 He concluded that "[t]he treaties
and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely
separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them
shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.""
Chief Justice Marshall next considered whether the 1819 Congressional
Act was a proper exercise of Federal power. He based his affirmative
answer on the Constitution's grant to Congress of the "powers or war and
peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations,
' According to
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."45
Chief Justice Marshall, such powers give Congress unrestricted power to
regulate intercourse with the Indians.46 He concluded that the Georgia
statutes were "repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States" in that they "interfered[d] forcibly with the relations established
between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which,
according to the settled principles of our constitution, is committed
exclusively to the government of the union," and are in

38. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
39. Id. at 675 (quoting Blue Jacket v. Johnson County, 72 U.S. 737, 760 (1866)).
40. 31 U.S. at 554-55.
41. Id. at 555. Examples of this mutuality are article three's provision for the
"perfectly equal" surrender of prisoners and the United States' acceptance, in article five, of
the Cherokee Nation's concessions in "allow[ing] the United States a road through their
country and the navigation of the Tennessee river . . is an acknowledgment of the right of
the Cherokees to make or withhold them." Id. at 556.
42. 31 U.S. at 556.
43. Id. at 557.
44. Id. at 557 (emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 559.
46. 31 U.S. at 561.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

direct hostility with treaties . . . which mark out the
boundary that separates the Cherokee country from
Georgia, guaranty to them all the land within their
boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States
to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it; and
recognize the pre-existing power of the nation to govern
itself4 7
Therefore, the Georgia statutes were void, and the Court reversed Worcester's conviction."
Where Chief Justice Marshall's Cherokee Nation opinion emphasized
in dicta the federal government's power pursuant to the guardian-ward
relationship, his Worcester opinion, with its discussion of the Cherokees'
understanding of the relationship they forged with the United States, sowed
the seeds of a corresponding obligation on the part of the federal government. The former would germinate much sooner than the latter.
B.

THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE IN SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER SIDE OF THE EQUATION

In United States v. Kagama,49 the Court cited Cherokee Nation and
Worcester as "perhaps the best statement of [the Indians'] position."5 The
plaintiff in error was Kagama, one of two Indians convicted of murdering
another Indian belonging to the same tribe on the tribe's reservation land.5
Kagama asked the Court to rule on the constitutional validity of Major
Crimes Act, which criminalized, under Federal Law, the murder of one
Indian by another on reservation land and gave federal courts jurisdiction
over that crime and under which Kagama had been indicted and convict2
5

ed.

Nearly three years before Kagama, and before the passage of the Major
Crimes Act in 1855, the Court had found that the federal court did not have
jurisdiction in Ex parte Crow Dog, a case presenting nearly identical
facts." In Crow Dog, the federal district court based its exercise of
jurisdiction over a Sioux Indian indicted for the murder of another Sioux on
Sioux reservation land on the conclusion that section 2146 of the Revised

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 562-63.
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
Id. at 382.
Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 376.
109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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Statutes, which excepts "crimes committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian" from the exercise of federal court jurisdiction
over crimes committed in Indian Country, had been impliedly repealed.54
One of two provisions cited by the district court as effecting this repeal was
included in an agreement with the Sioux ratified by act of Congress in 1877:
"[C]ongress shall, by appropriate legislation, secure for [the Sioux] an
orderly government; they shall be subject to the laws of the United
States."55 The Supreme Court, however, viewed the pledge to secure the
Sioux an orderly government as encompassing the "highest and best"
"among the arts of civilized life . . . self-government, the regulation by
themselves of their own domestic affairs."56 The Court also stated that the
provision subjected the Sioux, as a dependant community rather than as
individuals, not to the general laws of the United States but rather to those
laws "which applied to them as Indians.""
Justice Miller's opinion for the Court in Kagama is devoid of any
discussion of the possibility of exclusive tribal jurisdiction present in Crow
Dog. Miller stated that the Major Crimes Act was designed to make clear
the Congressional intent to repeal section 2146.58 He went on to conclude
that the Major Crimes Act was "within the competency of Congress,"59
offering the following in support:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States, - dependent largely for their daily food; dependant for their
political rights. They owe no allegiance to the states, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill

54. Id. at 562.
55. Id. at 566.
56. 109 U.S. at 568.
57. Id. at 569. The district court also cited a provision in an 1868 treaty with the
Sioux that "'if bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depredation upon the
person or property of any one, white, black, or Indian, subject to the authority of the United
States ... the Indians herein named solemnly agree that they will... deliver the wrong-doer
to the United States to be tried and punished according to its laws."' Id. at 567. The
Supreme Court concluded that interpreting this provision to apply to "a wrong committed by
one Indian upon another of the same tribe" would be inconsistent with the preceding
provision that, if the offender was "one of the Indians who are parties to the treaty" and the
offender was not given over to the United States, "deduction is to be made from the annuities
payable to the tribe, for the compensation of the injured person." Id.
58. 118 U.S. at 383. Miller pointed out that the Crow Dog Court had admitted that
"if the intention of congress had been to punish, by the United States courts, the murder of
one Indian by another, the law would have been valid." Id.
59. Id. at 383.
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feeling, the people of the states where they are found are
often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the federal government with them, and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power.60
This characterization, focusing on an abject dependency of the tribes,
stands in stark contrast to Chief Justice Marshall's characterization of the
Cherokee Nation as a "dependant ally" in Worcester.6 ' In fact, Justice
Miller mentions neither the extensive analysis of the relationship between
the Cherokee Nation and Great Britain, nor the discussion of how that
relationship informed the Cherokees' understanding of the relationship that
the early treaties forged between the Cherokee Nation and the United States
contained in Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Worcester.
Instead, Justice Miller cites Justice Baldwin's concurrence in Cherokee
Nation as a "valuable r6sum6 of the treaties and standards concerning the
Indian tribes previous to and during the confederation." 2 Justice Baldwin
presented a very different view of the effect of the treaty of Hopewell than
was presented by Chief Justice Marshall:
[The Cherokees] contracted by putting themselves under
the protection of the United States, accepted of the
allotment of hunting grounds, surrendered and delegated
to congress the exclusive regulation of their trade and the
management of all their affairs, taking no assurance of the
continued sovereignty, if they had it before, but relying on
the assurance of the United States that they might have
full confidence in their justice respecting their interests;
stipulating only for the right of sending one deputy of
their own choice to congress.63
This, like the tone of Justice Miller's Kagama opinion, focuses on the power
aspect of the tribal-federal relationship: the ward dependent on the
guardian's protection for survival, as opposed to Justice Marshall's depiction
of the weaker ally placing itself under the protection of the stronger against
encroachments onto its land and sovereignty. However, Justice Miller's
recognition that a "duty to protect," as well as power, arises out of the

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 384.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
118 U.S. at 382.
30 U.S. at 45.
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tribe's status as a ward does suggest an obligation, and perhaps a limitation,
on that power.
This focus on the power side of the equation continued in Lone Wolf,
in which Lone Wolf, on behalf of himself and the confederated Kiowa,
Comanche, and Apache tribes, sought a permanent injunction against
enforcement of an agreement 4 providing for the cession of commonly held
land.6" The Indians maintained that the cession was obtained fraudulently
and in violation of article 12 of the Medicine Lodge Treaty, which required
execution and signature by three-fourths of all adult males occupying the
land to be ceded." Lone Wolf argued that Congress could not divest the
confederated tribes of their interest in lands held by them in common by any

manner other than that specified in the Medicine Lodge Treaty. 7
The Court rejected that argument as "ignor[ing] the status of the
contracting Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and continue
to bear toward the government of the United States" ' and noted that
"[p]lenary authority of the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised
by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a
political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the
government." 9 Further, the Court articulated a presumption of "perfect
good faith in [Congress'] dealings with the Indians."7 This presumption
would appear to render hollow any obligation on the part of Congress that
may be inherent in the guardian-ward relationship by foreclosing on any
inquiry into Indian claims that Congress had not satisfied its obligation to
the Indians.
Lone Wolf s assumption of perfect good faith had been foreshadowed
the previous year in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.7' In Hitchcock, the
Cherokees challenged the decision of the Secretary of the Interior, under
authority granted him by act of Congress on June 28, 1889, to issue mineral

64. Formal treaty making between the federal government and Indian tribes was
brought to an end by the Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71.
Agreements between the tribe and the federal government continued to be negotiated and then
approved by both the Senate and House. See CoHEN, supra note 1, at 107.
65. 187 U.S. at 560.
66. Id. at 561. The Senate, in response to an inquiry regarding whether the requisite
signatures had been obtained, had been informed by the Secretary of the Interior that they
had not. Id. at 557. Additionally, the Indians had sent a memorial to Congress protesting
the agreement and requesting that it not be adopted. Id. at 558.
67. Id. at 564.
68. 187 U.S. at 564.
69. Id. at 565.
70. Id. at 568.
71. 187 U.S. 284 (1902).
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and oil leases for deposits on land held in trust by the tribe.72 The
Cherokees argued that this grant of authority to the Secretary was in direct
conflict with the treaty of New Echota, 1885, which granted the Cherokees
"the exclusive right to the use, control and occupancy of tribal lands."73
The Court, pointing to Congress's plenary power over the Indian tribes,
rejected the Cherokee's argument.74 The Court's opinion included the
following:
[T]he title to these lands is held by the tribe in trust for
the people. We have shown that this trust is not being
properly executed, nor will it be if left to the Indians, and
the question arises, What is the duty of the government of
the United States with reference to this trust? While we
have recognized these tribes as dependent nations, the
government has likewise recognized its guardianship over
the Indians and its obligations to protect them in their
property and personal rights.75
Having recognized a trust obligation on the part of the government,
however, the Court went on to say that it is not concerned with whether the
Secretary's decision to grant the leases was wise or "calculated to operate
beneficially to the interests of the Cherokees" because
[t]he power existing in Congress to administer upon and
guard tribal property, and the power being political and
administrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is
a question within the province of the legislative branch to
determine, and is not one for the courts. 76
In both Lone Wolf and Hitchcock, the Court recognized a trust
relationship but rejected the attempt on the part of the Indians to appeal to
the courts in order to hold the government accountable under that obligation.77 While the Court was not responsive to attempts by the Indians to
hold the government accountable under the trust doctrine, it did recognize
the government's power, under that doctrine, to act to protect Indian

72. 187 U.S. at 299.
73. Id. at 294.
74. Id. at 306.

75. Id. at 302 (quoting SENATE COMMITTE ON THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS,
Sen. Rep. No. 377, 53d Cong. 2d sess. (1894)).
76. 187 U.S. at 308.
77. Justice White wrote both the Lone Wolf and Hitchcockopinions. There were no
dissenters in either case.
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interests - as the government saw those interests and even in the face of
the disagreement of the Indian whose interest the government sought to
protect.
The power of the government to act to protect an Indian's interest
regardless of whether the Indian shared the government's view of what that
78
interest was is evidenced in Heckman v. United States. In Heckman, the
79
government had sued to cancel conveyances of allotted lands, located on
the Cherokee reservation and still held in trust by the government, in order
to protect the Indian grantors from their own inability to manage their land
prudently. 0 The defendant challenged the court's ability to issue a final
decree on grounds that the Indian grantors, who were necessary parties, were
absent." Because the Indian grantors were precluded from alienating their
land by Congressional Act, the Court concluded that "it could not,
consistently with any principle, be tolerated that, after the United States, on
behalf of its wards, had invoked the jurisdiction of its courts to cancel
conveyances in violation of the restrictions prescribed by Congress, these
82
wards should themselves be permitted to relitigate the question."
C.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A PROTECTION OF INDIAN
INTERESTS

The government also acted on behalf of Indians in situations where the
government's view of the. Indians' interest coincided with that of the Indian.
In Cramer v. United States,83 the government brought suit on behalf of
three individual Indians, seeking cancellation of a land patent issued by the
United States conveying land that the Indians had occupied continuously for
nearly half a century to a railway company." The case came before the
Supreme Court on the railway company's appeal from the judgment of the

78. 224 U.S. 413 (1912).
79. Allotted lands were those held in trust for individual Indians by the government.
The General Allotment, or Dawes, Act of 1887 provided for the allotment of tribal land to
reservation Indians and permitted non-reservation Indians an opportunity of allotment on
public domain lands. COHEN, supra note 1, at 130-31. The United States was to hold title
to the allotted lands for a period of twenty-five years, which could be extended by the
President, and the United States was authorized to negotiate the purchase of surplus lands
with the tribes. Id. at 131. Allotment was seen as promoting the full participation by Indians
in the American system which was inhibited by the differing white and Indian concepts of
property. Id. at 131-32.
80. 224 U.S at 417.

81. Id. at 444.
82. Id. at 446.
83. 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
84. Id. at 225.
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district court canceling the patent with regard to lands the Indians had either
enclosed or improved and from the decision by the circuit court extending
the cancellation of the grant to include the entire legal subdivisions
encompassing the enclosed or improved land. 5
The act of Congress conveying the land had excluded lands "granted,
sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, pre-empted or otherwise
disposed of." 6 The United States, as defendant, argued that the Indians'
land was not within this exclusion because the homesteading privilege had
not been extended to Indians at the time the patent was granted. 7 The
Court, however, found that the property was "reserved or otherwise disposed
of" because to hold that the Indians gained no possessory rights by
"attaching themselves to a definite locality, reclaiming, cultivating, and
improving the soil and establishing fixed homes thereon" 8 would contravene the government's policy of encouraging Indians to abandon their
nomadic habits.89
The Court has also sustained some Indian claims for damages resulting
from a failure of the executive to comply with the terms of a treaty or
agreement. One early example of this is United States v. Mille Lac Band

of ChippewaIndians.90 The Mille Lac Band had recovered damages in the
court of claims on grounds that the United States had disposed of lands
ceded to the United States by the Band in a manner violative of the act of
1889 under which the lands were ceded. 9' Although the act had provided

85. Id. at 226.
86. Id. at 225"(citing The Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242. 14 Stat. 239).
87. The patent was granted in 1866. 261 U.S. at 225. The homesteading privilege was
extended to Indians by the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 131, 18 Stat. 402, 420. 261 U.S. at
226.
88. 261 U.S. at 228.
89. Id. at 228-29. The Court also rejected the Government's argument, as defendant,
the action of the Government's agents in granting the patent estopped the United States from
maintaining a suit against the grant of the patent. Id. at 234. The Court reasoned that,
because the Indians acquired occupancy rights to the land with the implied consent of the
Government, the grant of the patent to the railway company was unauthorized and could
neither "bind the government ...[nor] deprive the Indians of their rights." Id.
90. 229 U.S. 498 (1913).
91. Id. at 499-500. This case involved a complicated set of facts, including a
disagreement over whether a treaty provision that "owing the heretofore good conduct of the
Mille Lac Indians, they shall not be compelled to remove so long as they shall not in any
way interfere with or in any manner molest the persons or property of the whites" permitted
the Band to remain on lands so long as their conduct toward the whites in the vicinity
complied with the provision. Id. at 501-02. The damages arose out of the act of 1889,
which resolved the disputes between the Government and the Mille Lac Band with regard to
their removal to the new reservation. Id. at 503, 509. These disagreements, however, are
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that the lands be classified pine and agricultural lands and disposed of in
accordance with the manner and price stipulated in the act and the proceeds
placed in a trust to be managed and distributed in accordance with the
provisions of the act, the government disposed of the land "under the
general land laws; not for the benefit of the Indians, but in disregard of their
rights."92 The Court noted that "[t]he cession was not to the United States
' and concluded that the Indians were "entitled to
absolutely, but in trust,"93
recover for the resulting loss" because the government's disposal of the
lands was "clearly in violation of the trust."94
The Court also indicated that the trust doctrine could have a limiting
effect on the government's discretion in Indian affairs in Lane v. Pueblo of
Santa Rosa,95 where the Court considered a suit by the Santa Rosa Pueblo
to enjoin the Secretary of Interior from "offering, listing, or disposing" of
as public lands land that the Pueblo claimed title to under the provisions of
the Gadsden Treaty between the United States and Mexico.96 Lane came
before the Court on appeal from a decision by the Court of Appeals for
District of Columbia reversing a decree dismissing a bill for injunction but
granting the Pueblo a permanent injunction.97 The Secretary of the Interior
argued that, because the Indians were wards of the United States, "disposal
of their lands [was] not within their own control, but subject to such
regulations as Congress may prescribe for their benefit and protection.""
The Court rejected this argument as irrelevant, stating that, even if it were
true,
it would not justify the defendants in treating the lands of
these Indians-to which, according to the bill, they have
complete and perfect title-as public lands of the United
States and disposing of the same under the public land

not germane to the importance of this case in the context of the trust doctrine, which is the
Court's affirmation of damages sustained as the result of the Government's failure to comply
with the provisions of the act by which lands were relinquished to the United States.
92. Id. at 509.
93. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 394 (1902).

94. 229 U.S. at 509. The Court remanded the case for a reassessment of the amount

of the damages due because the court of claims had included damages for some lands which

had been excluded by the act of 1889. Id. at 505-09.
95. 249 U.S. 110 (1919).
96. Id. at 111. Under the Gadsden Treaty of December 30, 1853, the United States
acquired lands in Arizona, including the land at issue in this case, from Mexico. Id.

97. Id.

98. Id. at 113.
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laws. That would not be an exercise of guardianship, but
an act of confiscation. 99
The Court remanded the case to the court of first instance, ordering that the
lower court grant a restraining order against taking action against the lands
until the defendants could respond to the bill to enjoin."
Although the Court's opinions in Lane and Mille Lac Band recognize
limitations on the power of government in regard to managing the affairs of
Indians, the cases did not involve suits brought on a theory of breach of a
trust obligations. The Supreme Court explicitly held the government to a
fiduciary standard in managing Indian affairs in Seminole Nation v. United
States.l"' Seminole Nation involved a claim brought by the Seminoles
against the United States for monetary damages for several alleged
violations of various treaties, agreements, and acts of Congress. 2 Under
a 1856 treaty between the United States and the Seminole Nation, the
government was obliged to make annual per capita disbursements of the
interest from a trust fund established for the Seminole Nation., 3 The
court of claims had found that the government had underpaid or failed to
pay on some annual disbursements, making some payments, at the request
of the Seminole General Council, directly to the tribal treasurer. 4 The
government argued that their treaty obligation was to the Seminole Nation
rather than to individual Seminoles and, therefore, that they had met that
obligation by payment to the tribal treasury at the request of the General
Council. 0 5 The Court, however, found the government's argument
deficient in its "fail[ure] to recognize the impact of certain equitable
consideration and the effect of the fiduciary duty of the government toward
its Indian wards."'0 6
The Seminoles had presented evidence that the General Council was
"notoriously and incurably corrupt" and that the government, specifically the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was aware of this corruption at the time the
99. 249 U.S. at 113.

100. Id.at 114.
101. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
102. Id. at 289. The Seminoles had appealed the decision of the lower court with regard
to five separate claims. The Supreme Court found no violation inthree of them. Id.at 28990.
103. Id. at 294.
104. Id. at 294-95, 301. Some payments were made to the Indian Agent for the
Seminole Agent rather than to individual Seminoles; the Court found that the Seminoles
could not recover these payments because they were authorized by the Act of April 26 1906,
ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.
105. 316 U.S. at 295.
106. Id.
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payments to the tribal treasurer were made.'0 7 The Court noted that "a
third party who pays money to a fiduciary for the benefit of the beneficiary,
with knowledge that the fiduciary intends to misappropriate the money or
otherwise be false to his trust, is a participant in the breach of trust and
liable therefor to the beneficiary" and that the General Council stood in a
fiduciary relationship to the individual Seminoles to whom the disbursements were due.'0° Because the government, "[u]nder a humane and self
imposed policy . . .[expressed] in many acts of Congress and numerous
decisions of [the Supreme] Court, has charged itself with moral obligations
of the highest responsibility and trust," the Court concluded that the
government's conduct toward the Indians should "be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards."'0 9 Because the court of claims had made
no finding of facts regarding the corruption of the General Council or the
government's knowledge of that corruption and because payment made to
a tribal council with knowledge of that council's corruption "would be a
clear breach of the Government's fiduciary obligation,"" 0 the Court
remanded the case, directing the court of claims to make the necessary
findings of fact to determine whether the government had breached its
fiduciary obligation and, if so, the extent of its liability."'
Lane, Mille Lac Band, and Seminole Nation all involved Court review
of administrative decisions, holding the Executive branch accountable under
the trust doctrine. These cases were not at odds with Lone Wolfs
presumption of congressional good faith in its actions as guardian of its
Indian wards. The Court has held Congress accountable in its handling of
Indian Affairs by applying the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause"' when
Congressional action resulted in a taking of Indian land without just
compensation.
In Shoshone Tribe of Indians of the Wind River Reservation v. United
States,"' the Court considered a claim by the Shoshones that the United

107. Id. at 295-300.
108. Id. at 296.
109. Id. at 296-97.
110. Id. at 297.
111. Id. at 307-08.
112. The Takings Clause provides: ... nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
113. 299 U.S. 476 (1937). One year earlier, in United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S.
103 (1935), a case stemming from a land cession by the Creeks of a portion of land they held
in fee simple. Government, as the result of a surveying error, had included a portion of
unceded Creek land when disposing of the ceded property. The Court noted that, although
the tribal property was under the Government's control and management as the result of the
guardianship of the United States, the power to manage "was not absolute... [but rather]
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providing that their Wind River

set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Shoshone Indians . . .and for such other
friendly tribes or individuals as from time to time they
may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to
admit amongst them." 4
The treaty further stipulated that no one, with a few enumerated exceptions,
would "ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in" the reservation."5 The government, however, brought a band of Arapahos, traditional
enemies of the Shoshones, onto the reservation under military escort after
obtaining the Shoshone Chief's agreement to allow the Arapahos to settle
peacefully on a close but separate tract of land." 6 Despite frequent complaints by the Shoshone, the government did not relocate the Arapaho.
About two years after the arrival of the Arapahos, the government began
discussions with the Indians regarding a cession of a portion of the reservation and, despite opposition from the Shoshones, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs held that the Arapahos and the Shoshones had equal rights to
the monetary compensation for the land ceded. 7 Congress subsequently
ratified two agreements for cession of land, one in 1897 and one in 1905,
both clearly recognizing that the two tribes had an equal interest in the
18
land."
The Shoshones sued for damages suffered because they had been
"permanently excluded from the possession and enjoyment of an undivided
half interest" in their tribal lands" 9 and the court of claims granted the
Shoshones relief. Both the Shoshones and the government were dissatisfied

subject to limitations inhering in such guardianship and to pertinent constitutional
restrictions." Id. at 109-10. In granting relief to the Creek Nation, the Court did not
specifically mention the Fifth Amendment, but rather gave Lane and Hitchcockas supporting
authority. Id. at 110.
114. Id. at 485-86.
115. 299 U.S. at 485-86.
116. Id. at 487. About nine years earlier, the Shoshones had allowed the Arapahos to
take refuge for a brief time on the Shoshone reservation while the Government tried to locate
a place for the Arapahos to settle. Id. at 486. The Arapahos had left, but the Government

had been
117.
118.
119.

unable to locate a place for them to settle. Id.
299 U.S. at 488-89.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 484.

1997]

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW & THE TRUST DOCTRINE

with the damage award and appealed to the Supreme Court. 20 In determining that the lower court had erred in not granting "such additional
amount beyond the value of the property rights when taken by the governthe
ment as may be necessary to [an] award of just compensation,''
Fifth
AmendCourt noted that "an appropriation within the meaning of the
ment" had occurred.12 The court went on to state that Congress' plenary
power under Lone Wolf did not extend to "enabl[ing] the government to
give tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, with' 23
out rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation.'
The Court addressed the application of the Takings Clause to Congress'24
dealings with Indians and Lone Wolf in United States v. Sioux Nation.1
Sioux Nation arose out of an act of Congress by which the Sioux ceded the
Black Hills to the United States in return for subsistence rations until the tribe
achieved self-sufficiency, aid in achieving civilization and self-sufficiency, and
the provision of schools, subject to the children's attendance of the schools and
25
This
the "labor of those who resided on lands suitable for farming."'
26
Treaty.
Laramie
Fort
earlier
the
of
agreement was an abrogation

120. The Government did not claim that no damages should be awarded but rather that
the damages should have been measured as on the date of the entry of the Arapahos unto the
Shoshone reservation. 299 U.S. at 492. The Court had measured the damages from the date
of a statement by the Commissioner of Indian affairs that the two tribes had an equal interest
in the land and that negotiation with the tribes regarding cession of reservation land should
be conducted on that basis. Id. The Shoshones, on the other hand, felt that damages should

be awarded as of the date of the jurisdictional act permitting them to bring the claim against
the United States. Id. The Supreme Court held that damages should be measured as of the
date of the illegal entry because of evidence tending to show that the Government had
intended that the Arapahos occupancy be permanent from the outset and because the right of
occupancy is primary with regard to Indian property interests. Id. at 494-96.
121. 299 U.S. at 496.
122. Id. at 497.
123. Id. at 497 (quoting Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 110).
124. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).

125. Id. at n.14. The interest of the United States in obtaining the Black Hills was the
result of pressure from settlers in the wake of discovery that the Black Hills contained rich
deposits of gold and silver. Id. at 376-79.
126. 48 U.S. at 382. The agreement was enacted despite the fact that only ten percent
of the adult males, as opposed to the seventy-five percent consent of three-fourths required
by the Fort Laramie Treaty, had signed the agreement. Id. at 382. It was also negotiated
after the Indians had been defeated in a conflict that arose when the Sioux, exercising their
right to hunt on unceded land outside the reservation, failed to return to reservation when
ordered to do so by the Indian Agents. Id. at 379. Given severity of the winter, compliance
with the order was impossible. Id. The Government then cut off subsistence rations. Id. at
381. As a result, the Sioux were particularity vulnerable during the negotiations.
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Sioux Nation came before the Supreme Court on an appeal by the
government of the court of claims' decision that the taking of the Black Hills
violated the Fifth Amendment and that, therefore, the Sioux were entitled to
interest as well as compensation for the value of the land taken. 127 In its
evaluation of this claim, the Court noted that the Court of Claims had relied on
the Fort Berthold "good faith test,' 12 1 which had been designed to square the
Lone Wolf line of cases with the line of cases to which Shoshone Tribe
belonged. 2 9 The Fort Berthold test distinguishes between situations in which
Congress acts in its capacity as trustee for the benefits of Indians and those in
which Congress exercises its sovereign power of eminent domain. 3 ' The
distinction turns on whether "Congress makes a good faith effort to give the
Indians full value of the land."'' When this is the case, Congress has acted
in its role as trustee, merely substituting one form of asset for another, and no
taking has occurred. 32 If there is no good faith effort to give full value, the
Court is reviewing Congress's exercise of eminent domain rather than its actions
as trustee and Lone Wolf does not apply.'
The Court concluded that an
inquiry into the adequacy of the government's consideration is inherent in the
Fort Berthold 34 After making that inquiry, the Court concluded that the
government had made no such good faith effort in its taking of the Black Hills;
the Court, therefore, affirmed the court of claims's decision granting interest as
3
well as compensation to the Sioux Nation.'
In United States v. Mitchell, 36 the Supreme Court first articulated the
Control Theory of the trust doctrine. Mitchell 11 involved the consolidated
claims of the Quinault tribe, an unincorporated association of Quinault
Reservation Allottees, and 1,465 individuals with interests in the allotments on
127. Id. at 386-87. The government's appeal also involved a claim that the Fifth
Amendment issue was barred because the court of claims had dismissed an earlier Fifth
Amendment claim by the Sioux. Id. While the Court discussed this issue in detail, that
discussion is not relevant to this context. The Government did not appeal the holding by the
Court of Claims Commission that "the Government had acquired the Black Hills through a
course of unfair and dishonorable dealing." Id. at 387. Establishing that the taking was
unconstitutional as opposed to unfair would entitle the Sioux to interest as well as
compensation. Id.
128. This test was set forth in Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United
States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968); 448 U.S. at 408.
129. 448 U.S. at 408.
130. Id.

131. Id. at 409.

132. Id.
133. See id. at 414-15.
134. 448 U.S. at 416.

135. Id. at 423-24.
136. 463 U.S. 206 (1983) [hereinafter MitchellI1].

1997]

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW & THE TRUST DOCTRINE

the Quinault Reservation, (jointly, "respondents"). 117 The respondents sought
to recover money damages incurred because the United States had breached its
fiduciary under various statutes by mismanaging timber resources on the
reservation.'
The case had previously been before the Court in Mitchell

1,139 where the Court reversed the Court of Claim's holding that, under

General Allotment Act,'° the United States had a fiduciary responsibility in
managing allotted timber lands and remanded the case for further consideration
by the lower court."" On remand, the Court of Claims found that federal
timber management statutes, 42 as well as various other federal statutes and
regulations, imposed on the United States a fiduciary duty with regard to its
management of timber on lands held in trust; the Government appealed.' 43
In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court began its considerations stating the
necessary inquiry for claims against the United States based on "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive departl
ment";'
"whether the source of substantive law can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the federal government for the damages sus-

137. Id. at 210.
138. Id. The specific allegation made by the respondents included the Government's
failure to:
sell the timber at fair market value; recover any payment for some merchantable
timber; pay any interest on some, and sufficient interest on other, government held
funds from timber sales; manage the timber resources on a sustained-yield basis;
provide sufficient road and easement systems for timber operations; and the
Government's extraction of "excessive administrative fees from allottees."
Id.
139. 445 U.S. 535 (1980). For discussions of the ramifications of Mitchelll on Indian
causes of action for breach of trust prior to Mitchellll, see Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing
the Federal-IndianTrust RelationshipAflerMitchell,31 CATH.U. L. REv. 635 (1982); Trude
Kless, Who Can Indians Trust After Mitchell?, 53 U. COL. L. REv. 179 (1981).

140. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
141. See Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 546. The MitchellI Court came to this conclusion
because the General Allotment Act "does not unambiguously provide that the United States
has undertaken fiduciary responsibilities as to the management of allotted lands," Id. at 553,
and the legislative history of the Act does not support reading it as requiring the Government
to manage the timber resources, Id. at 555. Noting that the Court of Claims had failed to
address other statutes cited by the respondent as a further basis for the Government's liability,
the Court pointed out that the lower court could consider them on remand. Id. at n.7.
142. 25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407, 466.
143. 463 U.S. at 211.
144. 462 U.S. at 218. Such claims come within the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts under
28 U.S.C. § 1491, known as the Indian Tucker Act, which waives Federal Sovereign Immunity
with regard to specific claims. Id. at 215. Claims founded on "any express or im-plied contract
with the United States" are included in that waiver. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491).
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tained."'45 The Court then examined the history of the timber management
statutes,146 beginning with the 1910 Act authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to sell timber on both unallotted and allotted lands for the benefit of the
Indians and in a manner conserving their interests.' 47 The Court noted that
both the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934141 and a 1964 amendment to the

timber management statute strengthened and emphasized the government's duty
to "assure a proper and permanent management of the Indian Forest . . .
assur[ing] that [it] will be permanently productive and will yield continuous
revenues to the tribes"'49 and "to consider 'the needs and best interests of the
Indian owner and his heirs."'"
According to the Court, this statutory
language, as well as similar language used in regulatory provisions, "directly
supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship."''
In addition to its
argument from the statutory language, the Court states that:
a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such elaborate control over forests and other
property belonging to Indians. All of the necessary elements
of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the United
States), a beneficiary (the Indians)
and a trust corpus (Indian
52
ftMds).
and
lands,
timber,
This is followed by a brief mention of the "existence of a general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indian people," which the Court

145. 463 U.S. at 218.
146. 25 U.S.C. § 406-407.
147. 463 U.S. at 220.
148. 25 U.S.C. § 466. The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 was "part of
[Commissioner of Indian Affairs] Collier's attempt to encourage economic development, selfdetermination, cultural plurality, and the revival of tribalism." COHEN, supra note 1, at 147.
In its final form, it was a compromise between those who saw it as an impediment to the
assimilation of Indians into mainstream America and those who felt further tribal autonomy
was necessary for Indian self-determination. Id. at 147-48. Its provisions included an
extending to the trust period on allotted lands and prohibitions against "further allotment of
Indian lands" and "transfer of restricted Indian lands except to Indian tribes." Id. at 148.
The IRA also permitted tribal organization, adoption of tribal constitutions, and the formation
of tribal business corporations, subject to review and approval by the Secretary of the
Interior. Id. at 149. A tribe could opt out of the IRA by vote of a majority of the tribal
members. Id.
149. 463 U.S. at 221 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 11730 (1934) (statement of Representative Howard, Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs and co-sponsor of the
Act).
150. Id. at 222 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 406(a)).
151. 463 U.S. at 224.
152. Id. at 225.

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW & THE TRUST DOCTRINE

19971

sees as "reinforcing" its construction of the pertinent statutes and regulations.'" It is because the statutes and regulations "clearly establish fiduciary
obligations of the government in the management and operations of Indian lands
and resources," however, "[that] the government should be liable in damages

for the breach."'

154

The Supreme Court has yet to define the parameters of Mitchell if. In the
wake of Mitchell if, commentators agree that the government will be found
liable for monetary damages resulting from a breach of trust where the requisite
statutory presence is found.'
There is less agreement concerning what is necessary to establish the
substantive right necessary for bringing a claim for breach of trust. Wood and
Ellwanger agree that, under Mitchell ff, a fiduciary obligation on the part of the
government arises from statutes that envision "a detailed management role for

the executive branch."' 56 Both are less confident about the future success of
the second source of a fiduciary duty discussed by the Court: the government's
Ellwanger sees the
assumption of extensive control over Indian property.'

Court's opinion as open to the interpretation that the elements of a common law
trust must be present before a fiduciary obligation capable of giving rise to a
cause of action for breach of tust can be established from the government's
assumption of control." 8 Rov, on the other hand, shows no hesitation in
stating that "Mitchell ff announced a presumption that the United States is

acting as a trustee when managing Indian property.""'59 This overstates the
holding by ignoring the Mitchell if Court's entire discussion of the comprehensiveness of the federal control over timber management.
The narrow grounds on which the Court distinguished Mitchell if from
Mitchell I are an indication of how much play the court can get out of
"comprehensive." The Court is giving future Courts room to define "comprehensive" in a way that will reach whichever outcome they desire.
Regardless of how the Court applies Mitchell if, comprehensive control in the
153. Id. (citing, among others, Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296
(1942); United Statesv. Shoshone Tribe, 305 U.S. 382,386 (1938); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 382-84 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)).
154. 463 U.S. at 226.

155. See, e.g., Wood, supranote 13, at 1521; Michael Roy, Indians May Suefor Breach

of FederalTrust Relationship:United States v. Mitchell, 26 B.C. L. REv. 809, 840 (1985);

Kimberly T. Ellwanger, Money Damages For Breach of the Federal-Indian Trust
RelationshipAflerMitchellII- UnitedStatesv.Mitchell, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (1983), 59 WASH.

L. REv. 675, 680 (1984).
156. Wood, supra note 13, at 1519; see also Ellwanger, supra note 155, at 681.
157. Wood, supra note 13, at 1519; Ellwanger, supra note 155, at 681-82.
158. Ellwanger, supra note 155, at 687.
159. Roy, supra note 155, at 841.
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area of interest would have to be established before an enforceable obligation
would exist under Mitchell ff. A more global version of the control doctrine
would preempt the case-by-case analysis that permits the shifting sensitivities
of successive Courts to alternatively expand and contract tribal rights. 60
In 1983, the year the Court decided Mitchell I, the Court decided another
case which undermined the value of the trust doctrine as a source of formal
federal fiduciary obligations toward Indians in areas where the Department of
the Interior is obliged to consider the competing interests of more than one
party. In Nevada v. United States, 6' the Court held that res judicata 162
barred a claim for water rights sufficient to maintain the level necessary to
prevent extinction of the fish indigenous to the Pyramid Lake located on the
Pyramid Lake Reservation. 6 The United States had initiated the "Orr Ditch
Litigation" in 1935 to adjudicate the water rights to the Truckee River, which
flowed into Pyramid Lake. 64 The government, which represented the claims
of both the Paiute Tribe and the Newlands Reclamation Project, 65 based the
amount of water it claimed on behalf of the Tribe on its anticipated irrigation
needs.'66 The Orr Ditch decree did not include the water from the Truckee
River necessary to maintain the level of Pyramid Lake required by the tribal
fisheries located on the reservation at the time the Executive Order created the
Pyramid Lake Reservation. Therefore, the government sought additional rights
on behalf of the tribe in 1973, again basing the claim on the implied reservation

160. The Canadian Supreme Court has found a fiduciary duty toward the Indians on the
part of the Crown arising from the "power of control and management vested in the
Commissioner [of Indian lands]." Richard H. Barlett, The FiduciaryObligationofthe Crown
to the Indians,53 SASK. L. REv. 301 (1989) (citing Canada v. Girioux, 53 S.C.R. 172 (Can.
1916). Barlett's article contains a discussion of the effect of MitchellI on the Canadian
Supreme Court decision involving Canada's trust obligation in Guerinv. The Queen 2 S.C.R.

790 (Can. 1987).

161. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
162. Resjudicata is the rule that "a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and,
as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to .asubsequent action involving the same claim,
demand, or cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979).
163. 463 U.S. at 116. The tribe's water rights claim was based on the doctrine set forth
in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), which held that "a right to the amount of
river water necessary to effectuate the purposes" the creation of an Indian Reservation were
impliedly reserved by the agreements that created them. Id.
164. Id.
165. The project was developed pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902, which sought

to reclaim arid western lands through irrigation and make them available to homesteaders.
Id. at 115.
166. Id. at 118.
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of those rights. 67 The Paiute Tribe, who had not been a party to the Orr
Ditch Litigation, was granted the right to intervene in the 1973 litigation in support of the govern-ment. 16 1 The Court, relying on language in both the 1935
settlement and the Government's complaint tending to show that the Orr Ditch
decree was intended as a final adjudication of the parties' water rights with
69
by res judicata. 1
regard to the Truckee River, found the 1973 claim barred
The Court's Nevada opinion was particularly troubling because of its
reversal of the Court of Appeals decision that "[b]y representing the Tribe and
the Project against the Orr Ditch defendants, the governif ent compromised its
duty of undivided loyalty to the Tribe."' 7 ° Because the United States
represented the Tribe in the Orr Ditch Litigation, the Court found that the tribe
was a party to the Orr Ditch Decree and could not relitigate the "implied
72 in supreservation of water rights issue.''. The Court cited Heclanan
port of this conclusion. 7 '
Heclnan, unlike Nevada, involved a situation in which the government
This situation is
and the "Indian wards" were in an antagonistic stance.
government was
the
where
qualitatively different from the situation in Nevada,
representing the interests of the tribe in relation to other parties, one of which
was also represented by the same governmental department, competing for the
same limited resource. In Heclanan, the relitigation of the question would have
involved the Indian grantees directly opposing the government's position, while
in Nevada the "relitigation" would have involved the litigating of the water
necessary for maintaining the level of Pyramid Lake, an aspect of the water
rights issue neglected by the government in the original litigation.
The Nevada Court declined to "pass judgment on the quality of the
representation [the tribe] received" because the tribe had sued the government
for damages in the court of claims in 1951, receiving a settlement of $8,000,000
74 The Court
after waiving further liability on the part of the United States.
does discuss how the Department of Interior's conflicting obligations affect the
standard to which its representation of tribal interests will be held. Noting that
Congress had seen fit to "require the secretary to carry water on at least two
shoulders when it delegated to him the responsibility for the supervision of the
167. 463 U.S. at 118.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 131-32.
170. Id. at 141 (quoting United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, 649 F.2d
1286, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981)).
171. 463 U.S. at 133.
172. 224 U.S. 413 (1912). See supra note 78 and accompanying text for a discussion

of Heckman.

173. 463 U.S. at 135.
174. 463 U.S. at 135, n.14.
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Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation projects in areas adjacent
to reservation lands," the Court continued:
it is simply unrealistic to suggest that the Government may
not perform its obligation to represent the tribes in litigation
when Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as
well. In this regard, the Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his
duties to hiq single beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's con75
sent.1

The use of the word "solely" might be interpreted as implying that additional
facts may add up to a breach of trust. Later in its opinion, however, the Court
states
[i]t may be that where only a relationship between the
Government and the tribe is involved, the law respecting
obligations between a trustee and a beneficiary in a private
litigation will in many, if not all, respects, adequately
describe the duty of the United States. But where Congress
has imposed upon the United States, in addition to its duty
to represent Indian tribes, a duty to obtain water rights for
reclamation projects, and has even authorized the inclusion
of reservation lands within the project, the analogy of a
faithless private fiduciary cannot be controlling for purposes
of evaluating the authority of the United States to represent
76
different interests.

175. Id. at 128; see also id. at 142.
176. Id. at 142. The tribe also argued that resjudicata, even if otherwise applicable, would
amount to a denial of their due process rights. Id. at 144 n.16. The tribe cited Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1946), to support its claim that, in the On Ditch Litigation, they
were not given notice as required in a final accounting between beneficiary and trustee and
Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), to support its claim that it was also denied a full and fair
opportunity to be heard as required when there is a conflict of interest between certain class
members and the class representatives in a class action suit. Id. The Court dismissed these

arguments on grounds that no conflict existed, that the tribe's representative, Government, had

adequate notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and that the tribe had a remedy against
the Government of which it had already availed itself. Id.
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This passage does include sufficient facts specific to Nevada to allow a court
77 It is equally
sympathetic to tribal rights to draw a narrow distinction.'
likely, however, that the Nevada Court's reasoning will be applied so as to
lessen the government's obligation to protect tribal interests in other situations
where the government can show it has a dual role creating split loyalty in the
circumstances of the case. Nevada also demonstrates the continued deference
the Court shows toward Congressional action. A stronger version of the trust
doctrine, which focuses on the government's obligation to reinforce and protect
tribal sovereignty, would strengthen the priority of the tribal interests in dual
loyalty situations.
The trust doctrine, in its current form, has not been extended to include a
governmental obligation to promote self-government. The Court will review
administrative decisions concerning the management of Indian affairs, holding
the Executive Branch to a fiduciary standard if there is statutory language
7
indicating Congressional intent that "the best interest of the Indian owner"
be taken into account in managing property specifically addressed by statute,
or if the government has assumed comprehensive control of Indian property.1 9 The Court's Sioux Nation opinion makes it clear that, while the
Takings Clause may be applicable to land taken in abrogation of previous
treaties, the Court has not abandoned Lone Wolfs assumption of Congressional
good faith in its actions as trustee in managing Indian affairs. Under Nevada,
the government cannot be held to a fiduciary standard if it has a conflicting
duty to take into account a competing interest."' Finally, when a breach of
trust is found, equitable remedies are generally not available.'

177. As the inclusion of discussion specific to the General Allotment Act in Mitchell
I allowed Mitchellfl to be distinguished on narrow grounds by its discussion of the timber
management statutes.
178. Mitchell II, 463 U.S, at 221.
179. See Wood, supra note 13, at 1568; Reid, supra note 7, at 1230.
180. Charles F. Wilkenson points out that, in Nevada, issues of judicial finality may

have overridden policies in favor of holding government officials to a strict standard in
managing Indian affairs because the length of time that had passed since the rendering of
the decision challenged had resulted in a buildup of "powerful reliance interests." CHARLES
F. WILKENSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN

CONSTITUIONAL DEMOCRACY 85 (1987). His discussion of Nevada suggests that, even in
dual loyalty situation, government officials may be held some heightened level of "care,
competence, and integrity." Id. While this is true, my concern is still that courts unsympa-

thetic to Indian interests have been granted yet another route to limit the trust obligation.
181. See, Chambers, supra note 7, at 1242-43.
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COMMENTATORS AND THE TRUST DOCTRINE

Various Commentators have written on the trust doctrine. In this
section I present several accounts of the trust doctrine that point to areas in

which the trust doctrine, in its current form, is deficient. As these areas
must be addressed by any adequate justification of the trust doctrine, I return

to them in part IV, where I discuss them in terms of the justification I
propose.
Mary Christina Wood characterized the early federal-Indian trust
relationship as the "sovereign trusteeship" model, which she described as
"premised on a model of federal-tribe relations organized around a paradigm
of native separatism."' 82 In addition to the Cherokee cases, she cited the
Trade and Intercourse Acts" 3 and the Northwest Ordinance" 4 in support of
her characterization. 8 5 She contrasted this early model with the "guardian-ward" paradigm which has its roots in United States v. Kagama 186 and
focuses on tribal dependency.8 7
While the "sovereign trusteeship"
paradigm is directed at native separatism, the "guardian-ward" paradigm is
directed at assimilation.'
Wood noted that, although the two models are
often treated synonymously and the "guardian-ward" language of Kagama

182. Wood, supra note 13, at 1498.
183. The Trade and Intercourse Acts are a series of Congressional Acts passed between
1790 and 1834, generally in "response to worsening frontier conditions characterized by
aggressive whites infringing on the territory of tribes in violation of the treaties." Id. The
acts provided for the exclusion and removal of non-Indians from Indian territories, prohibited
alienation of Indian land without Federal approval, and regulated Indian trade with non-

Indians. Id.
184. The Northwest Ordinance was passed by Congress in 1787. Wood cites the
following language from Article III:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their
property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in
justified and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and
humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs done to them,

and for preserving peace and friendship with them.

Id. at 1499. See also, Mark Allen, Comment, Native American Controlof Tribal Natural
Resource Development in the Context of the Federal Trust and TribalSelf-Determination,16
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 857, 858 (1989) (citing Larry B. Leventhal, American IndiansThe Trust Responsibility: An Overview, 8 HAMLINE L. REv. 625. 627 (1985)).

185.
186.
187.
188.

Wood, supra note 13, at 1498-99.
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
Wood, supra note 13, at 1503.
Id. at 1504.
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applying the trust doctrine, both paradigms
often appears in modem cases
189
coexist.
to
continued
have
Wood noted that "the trust doctrine is particularly important in the
modem era of self-determination as a means of responding to threats to the
She sees in the trust doctrine a potential shield
native land base."' 9
against "environmental threats both to the tribal land base and to shared
resources such as water and wildlife."''
She recognizes, however, that the trust doctrine must be cleaved from
the plenary power doctrine in order for the trust doctrine to act as "doctrine
of federal restraint, not permission, and as an important source of protection
of Indian rights."' 92 A footnote at the end of Wood's discussion of
plenary power points out that the basis of the Lone Wolf Court's sanction
of unilateral treaty abrogation by Congress was the Court's failure to distin93 Wood suggests that a trust
guish between foreign and Indian treaties.'
obligation arose out of the early treaties, which are in fact land transactions
but does not develop this idea.194
Reid Peyton Chambers has written about the interrelationship of treaty
abrogation and the trust doctrine. He argued that overruling Lone Wolf and
reading the Cherokee cases as establishing a broad trusteeship on the part
of the federal government could provide a basis for holding Congress to a
"rigid duty of 'exclusive loyalty' in managing Indian property, and
requir[ing Congress] to [strictly] observe treaties and executive agreements
with Indian tribes."' 9 5 In discussing the pros and cons of overruling Lone
Wolf, Chambers pointed out that, although requiring strict adherence to
treaties with Indian tribes would afford those treaties "greater permanence
189. Id. Charles Scott, on the other hand, sees the trust relationship as the result of the
awkward merging of the concepts ofplenary power and the guardian-ward relationship which

are the legacy of Cherokee Nation and Lone Wolf. Charles Scott, AdministrativeLaw: SelfDetermination and the Consent Power: The Role of the Government in Indian Affairs; 5 AM.

L. REv. 195, 197 (1977). The result is a self-imposed, judicially enforced duty
requiring the government "to exercise its great authority only in the best interest of the
INDIAN

Indians." Id.

190. Wood, supra note 13, at 1476. The history of United States Indian policy has been
divided into six eras: "Discovery, Conquest and Treaty-Making,from 1532 to 1828; Removal
and Relocation, from 1828 to 1887; Allotment and Assimilation, from 1887 to 1928;
Reorganization and Self-Government, from 1928- 1887; Termination, from 1945 to 1961; and
Self-Determination, from 1961 to the present." Id. at n.3 (citing VINE DELORIA, JR. &
CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 2-24

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Wood, supra note 13, at 1505.
Id. at 1507-08.
Id. at n.359.
Id.
Chambers, supra note 7, at 1227.

(1983).
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than treaties with foreign nations which can be unilaterally abrogated,"""..,.a requirement of strict adherence may be appropriate with
regard to treaties "between a nation and its dependant subjects protected by
'
a trust responsibility."197
Chambers noted that the Lone Wolf doctrine may
appear sound because of the difficulty of judicial enforcement of imprecise
treaties and the necessity of flexibility in the formation of public policy.
However, he suggested that these difficulties may be overcome by allowing
Congress only to "mak[e] modifications to meet changed conditions,"
provided those modifications are consistent with the mutual intent of the
parties and provided that the modification is in response to a "compelling
public need."' 98
The limitations suggested by Chambers would be in keeping with an
interpretation of the trust doctrine that is protective of tribal sovereignty.
Chambers does not, however, present an argument for why the trust doctrine
should protect tribal sovereignty or present any authority upon which such
limitations of Congress could be based.
Chambers noted that Lone Wolfs bite has been mitigated by the
Court's application of the Fifth Amendment's requirement ofjust compensation when Congress exercises its power of treaty abrogation and diminishes
Indian land holdings secured by a treaty or agreement.' 99 He also noted
the line of cases, to which Lane and Crammerbelong, in which the Court
has used the trust doctrine to enforce limitations on the executive branch in
its deals with the Indians.2 °° This line of cases, however, is limited to
monetary damages. As Chambers points out, if monetary damages remain
the exclusive remedy for the taking of Indian property, Indian culture will
lose its "underlying environment" and "the purpose of the trusteeship
guarantee as perceived by Chief Justice Marshall . . . may not be realized." '' In Part II I argue that the use of social contract theory as a basis

196. Id. The Lone Wo/fopinion notes Congressional power to pass legislation which
conflicts with treaties with foreign nations in support of its decision that Congress may
unilaterally abrogate provisions of an Indian treaty. 187 U.S. at 566 (citing Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
197. Chambers, supra note 7, at 1227.

198. Id. at 1228-29.
199. Chambers, supra note 7, at 1229.
200. Id. at 1230. See Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating
Sovereignty.SecretarialDiscretionandthe Leasingof Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1061
(1974), for a discussion of the Department of the Interior's involvement in leasing decisions
regarding tribal land.

201. Id. at 1235. The authors particularly noted the importance of equitable relief in

"conflicts between Indian trustee responsibilities and competing government
projects that

affect countless federal agencies." Id. at 1236. This scenario was later presented to the
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for the trust doctrine will extend the scope of the trust doctrine to the tribal
right to self-government. This will entail equitable relief where the
government acts in a manner limiting tribal sovereignty.
Like Wood, a Harvard Law Review Note identified two theories
articulated by courts subsequent to the Cherokee Cases as potential sources
of the trust relationship: the cultural theory of trust relationship and the
control theory of trust relationship.20 2 The "cultural theory," which
characterizes the Supreme Court's use of the trust doctrine from the late
nineteenth to early twentieth century, is much like Wood's guardian-ward
paradigm. It focuses on the dependency of the Indians and the Christian
duty of the United States in its "treatment of an ignorant and dependent
race."2 3 The Harvard Note found the cultural theory inadequate because
its grounding in racial intolerance is inconsistent with "widely accepted
tenants [sic] of contemporary morality" and its vague prescriptive implicato allow the higher culture to destroy the inferior culture
tions are as likely
204
it.
as to protect
The control theory 2°s refers to the source of the trust obligation
increasingly relied on by modem courts: the assumption of elaborate control
over a particular area of tribal concern. The Note criticizes the control
theory as either logically circular or over inclusive: if control is justified
because the government cannot fulfill its trust obligation without it, control
cannot in turn justify the trust obligation; on the other hand, if the fact that
the government's control of tribal property generates a trust obligation, then
would owe a fiduciary duty to all owners of regulated
the government
206
property.
The Note suggests that four moral principles support a trust doctrine
based on an autonomy principle: self-determination, promise-keeping, liberal
freedom, and public freedom. 2 7 According to the Note, the autonomy
principle requires the United States to "afford the tribes enough political
autonomy to enable them to chart their own economic, social, and cultural
Court in Nevada,see supranotes 160-80 and accompanying text. The Court's unwillingness
to give its obligation to the Indians thus sets a troublesome precedent.
202. Note, Rethinkingthe Trust Doctrine in FederalIndian Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 422
(1984) [hereinafter Note].
203. Id. at 426 (citing Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877)).
204. Id.
205. The Note attributes the Control theory to Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States,
624 F.2d 981 (Ct. Cl. 1980), where the court stated that a fiduciary duty on the part of the
Government arises whenever the Government controls or supervises tribal property or
moneys. It sees Mitchelll as affirming the control theory. Note, supra note 202, at 427-28.
206. Note, supra note 202, at 429.
207. Id. at 430.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

development""2 ° and requires judges "to recognize and enforce [the
autonomy principle] . . . to the greatest extent possible within the
constraints of their institutional role."2 °9 Other than appeal to "moral
principles prevalent in American political discourse,"2' 1 the Note provides
no justification for the Court to impose a set of moral principles on the
other two branches of the government.2 ' Nor does the Note provide a
reason why principles that usually attach to individual rights should be
extended to the rights of a group.
IV.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT PARADIGM OR THE FEDERAL-INDIAN
TRUST RELATIONSHIP

The Court's use of the trust doctrine, sketched out in Part 11, has shown
it to be double-edged sword. One edge has given Congress nearly absolute
power over Indian affairs. The other has permitted the Indians to enforce
obligations traceable to treaties and agreements with the government or to
statutes relating to the management of Indian affairs. The ability of the
government to litigate on behalf of Indians to protect Indian interests has cut
both ways, depending on whether the government and the Indian share a
similar view of what those interests are.
The trust doctrine has not developed into a weapon with which Indians
can hold Congress accountable for protecting the tribal interest in selfgovernment and sovereignty. I propose that the trust doctrine be forged into
such a weapon by grounding it, not on Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in
the Cherokee Cases, but rather in the social contract theory of the relation208. Id. at 429-30.
209. Id. at 434.
210. Note, supra note 202, at 429.
211. The Court's opinion in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), might provide
a potential justification. In considering the constitutionality of statutory provisions giving
Indians preferential status for employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the MancariCourt
out pointed that the Constitution itself "singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate
legislation," id. at 552 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress regulatory
power over commerce with Indians), art. II § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to'
make treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate)), and that Indian tribes and
reservation have historically received special legislative treatment. Id. at 552. In this
context, the Court found that the special treatment was not racial but instead was analogous
to residency requirements for membership in city counsel. Id. at 554. The Court stated: "As
long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' [sic] unique
obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed." 417 U.S.
at 555. The legislation in Mancarimet this requirement because it promoted the federal

policy of increasing Indian participation in their own self-government. Id. at 541. The step
from using this rationale to find a statute constitutional to using to justify imposing an
obligation on Congress would, however, require justification.
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ship between a government and those it governs. The opinions in the
Cherokee cases give insight into the nature of the implied social contract
between the government and the Indians, but it is the contract itself that is
the source of the trust relationship.
A.

SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AND THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL- INDIAN
CONTRACT.

Social contract theory provides an answer to the question of why
individuals submit to the authority of a government to limit their inherent
Social contracts
right to punish attacks on themselves or their property.
"legal fictions"
the
be
may
they
or
constitution,
a
in
may be formalized, as
I take the view that constituthat legitimize governmental authority.
tions are merely the formalization of an implied contract between the
Government and the governed. The rights of the governed, in the case of
the contract between the United States and its citizens, are formalized in the
Bill of Rights. Formalized or not, the rights of the governed are the
contractual limits the governed set on the legitimate authority of the
government.
I argue that treaties between the United States and the various Indian
tribes, like constitutions, are the formalization of an implied contract by
which the Indians accepted the authority of the federal government, giving
up their right to defend themselves from intrusions on their sovereignty in
return for the United States Government's promise to protect their
sovereignty. In this sense, the tribal right to self-government is analogous
to a constitutional right: it is the contractual limitation on the legitimate
power of the government of the United States over the Indians. The United
States Government has, therefore, an obligation to protect the tribal right of
self-government to the same degree as constitutional rights.
1. Treaties Are Representationsof an Implied Social ContractBetween
a Government and Those it Governs.
Despite the common nomenclature, Indian treaties were not the
qualitative equivalents of treaties with foreign nations. Chief Justice
212. See generally BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 829-33
(Simon and Schuster 1972) (1945). Russell's discussion on the pages cited centers around

John Locke's version of social contract theory. Social contract theory had its origins in an

attempt to replace the Divine Right Theory as the source of the legitimacy of Government.
The Divine Right Theory, developed at a time when rule by aristocracy was the norm,
maintained that authority of the king was bestowed by God. Social Contract theory placed
the source of governmental authority in the consent of the governed.
213. Id. at 629.
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Marshall recognized this in his description of the Cherokee Nation as a
"domestic dependent nation."2 4 The early treaties between the United
States and the various Indian tribes established a relationship in which the
Indian tribe acquiesced to the authority of the United States, who then
promised to protect the tribe.215 Acquiescence to the sovereignty of the
United States with regard to its relation with other sovereigns216 is inherent in the treaty language acknowledging that the tribe was "under the
protection of the United States and of no other sovereign."2 7 When this
acquiescence is taken together with the United States' promise to protect the
tribe against incursions on tribal territory, the treaty becomes a formalization
of a social contract. The implied contract, as the basis of the legitimacy of
the government's authority over the tribe, exists whether or not it is
formalized in a treaty. This means that, under the social contract paradigm,
the government's obligation to protect the tribal right to self-government
exists even in the absence of a treaty -with the tribe.
2.

The Right to Self-Government is a ContractualLimitation on the
Authority of United States Over Indian Tribes Analogous to Constitutional Rights Enforced by the Court.

Just as constitutional rights are the contractual terms limiting the
authority of the United States over its citizens, the right to self-government
is the contractual term limiting the power of the United States Government
over Indian tribes. With regard to constitutional rights, the basic holder of
the right is the individual citizen: it is the individual that enjoys of freedom
of speech, religion, and association, as well as the right to be secure in his
own home.2"' The government limits those rights when they threaten the
well being of others, for example when speech crosses a line and becomes
"fighting words," which threaten the safety of other citizens.2" 9

214. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
216. See 30 U.S. at 17. Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of the limitations on native
sovereignty - that they no longer possessed the right to treat with other nations or to
alienate title to their lands - gives the doctrine of discovery rather than treaty language as
the source of the limitation. Id.
217. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) ("the right.., of
presumptively innocent people to be secure in their homes from unjustified, forcible

intrusions by the Government-is weighty").

219. See, e.g., NAACP v.Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) ("It is
clear that 'fighting words'-those that provoke immediate violence-are not protected by the
First Amendment.").
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In the case of tribal rights, the basic unit is the tribe.22° The right of
an individual to be secure in his own home can be converted from an
individual right into a tribal right: the right to be secure on its own
reservation, which is precisely what the tribal right to self-government is
about. Chief Justice Marshall's Worcester opinion shows how this right is
inherent in the Indians' understanding of the federal-Indian relationship that
arose out of the treaty-making era.
Chief Justice Marshall outlines the foundational rights the Indians
would have understood - given their preceding relationship with Great
Britain - that the United States had agreed to protect: intrusions into their
country and encroachment on their lands.22' Because, as recognized by
Chief Justice Marshall, "it is inconceivable that [the Indians] could have
supposed themselves ... to have divested themselves of the right to selfgovernment,"2'22 and because the reach of State laws and regulations into
Indian Land is both a form of encroachment on the land and a divestiture
of self-government,22 3 it is arguable that the right to self-government was
included in the rights the Indians believed the United States to have
undertaken to protect. The canon of construction requiring that treaties be
interpreted as the Indians would have understood them,224 mandates
adopting the Indians' understanding of the obligation undertaken by the
United States in its early treaties with the Indians. Because the tribe's
ability to effectively govern itself is dependent on both maintaining its land
base and on its economic security, the government also has a trust
responsibility with regard to any tribal property it undertakes to hold in trust
or manage on behalf of the tribe.

220. See CHARLES F. WILKENSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7 (1987).
221. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

222. 31 U.S. at 554. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text. Although Chief
Justice Marshall was speaking specifically of the language in Article Nine of the treaty of
Hopewell, his rational is equally applicable to the Cherokee's understanding of the effect of
the treaty itself.
223. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. l, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I am in full agreement with the majority that zoning... may indeed be the most
essential function performed by local government.") quoted in Brendale v. Confederated

Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 458 (1989) (Blackmum, J.,
dissenting).
224. This canon is an "acknowledgment of the unequal bargaining position[s]." COHEN,
supra note 1 at 222. Because it is an extension of the rules of interpretation used in
contracts, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 201-03, no circularity is involved
in using it as a step in justifying the trust doctrine.
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The promises of the United States included protection against
incursions by white settlers onto their land.225 That these agreements were
taken seriously by the Indians is demonstrated in a message sent to President
Washington by the Cherokee Chiefs in response to continued incursions by
white settlers onto Cherokee land, reminding Washington of the United
States promises in the treaty of Hopewell: "[W]e gave up to our white
brothers all the land we could anyhow spare, and have but little left to raise
our women and children upon, and we hope you won't let any people take
any more from us without our consent." 226 This suggests an understanding on the part of the Cherokees that the United States has the power, if not
the authority, to prevent or permit the taking.
B. IMPLICATION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT PARADIGM OF THE FEDERALINDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP.

Wood recognized the connection between the trust doctrine and the
plenary power doctrine would have to be broken before the trust doctrine
could effectively function as a doctrine of restraint.227 When based in
social contract theory, the trust doctrine is no longer an outgrowth of power.
The tribal right to self-government, as foundational right in the federalIndian relationship, is equivalent to the constitutional rights foundational to
the federal-citizen relationship. Because the government's trust obligation
is not based on the individual treaties or on Congressional power but rather
on rights inherent in the federal-Indian implied social contract, that
obligation binds all branches of the government, imposing an obligation on
the Court to enforce tribal rights. The Court must, therefore, subject both
Congressional and Executive action in violation of the trust obligation to the
same strict scrutiny as fundamental constitutional rights.
Basing the government's trust obligation on an implied social contract
22
with the Indians provides the justification, lacking in the Harvard Note,
for extending autonomy principles to Indian tribes and for the Court's
review of Congressional and Executive action in light of these principles.
They can be extended to Indian tribes because, in Indian Law, the tribe, not
the individual, is the basic unit. The Court can enforce them because the
trust obligation attaches to all branches of the government.
Chambers suggested that overruling Lone Wolf may be a prerequisite
for holding Congress accountable under the trust doctrine. The Court is

225. See, e.g., Treaty of Hopewell, art. V, IV; Washburn, supra note 32.
226. IV Washburn, supra note 32, at 2275.
227. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.

228. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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extremely unlikely to do this: in the context of Indian Law, the Court tends
to distinguish precedent rather than overturn it.229 The need to overrule
Lone Wolf might be avoided by distinguishing cases brought for breach of
a trust arising out of treaty rights to land or property from breach of trust
claims arising out of the government's obligation, under its implied social
contract with the Indian tribes, to protect the tribal right to self-government.
The implied social contract does not rest on the Congress' plenary power
under Article I sections eight and two of the Constitution.23 Because
Congress is not acting as a trustee under the plenary power doctrine, Lone
Wolf would not apply here anymore than it does when the Court reviews
Congress' exercise of eminent domain, as it did in Sioux Nation.
Chambers also pointed out that equitable relief in cases involving the
taking of Indian land is crucial to maintaining Indian sovereignty.23 1
Because the Indians would have understood that the United States had
undertaken to protect their freedom from encroachment onto their lands as
part of the social contract underlying the federal-Indian relationship,23 2 the
social contract paradigm favors equitable relief over monetary relief in cases
involving the taking of Indian land.
The social contract paradigm is similar to the "model of Indian
expectations," which assumes that the Indians "voluntarily vested title to
their land in the government as trustee ... [and] then asks what terms the
'
David McNeill criticized
Indians would have provided in such a trust."233
is speculative, has "an
that
it
grounds
on
model
expectations
Indian
inescapable element of Monday morning quarterbacking," and "risks
sovereignty confrontations with the United States."234 While it might be
argued that the first two criticisms apply to the social contract paradigm of
the trust doctrine, the same might be said of any legitimizing theory.
229. See Michael C. Blumm & Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of Appeals: A
Modest Proposal to Eliminate Supreme Court JurisdictionOver Indian Cases, 46 ARK. L.
REV. 203, n.173 (1993).
230. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
233. Daniel McNeill, Trusts: Toward an EffectiveIndian Remedy for Breach of Trust,
8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 429, 456 (1980). Daniel McNeill argued that the absence of a
"coherent model of the government-Indian relation" is an obstacle to remedies in Indian
breach of trust actions. Id. at 453. He characterized the early Supreme Court Indian law
decisions as allowing Congress to "gain[] the power of a trustee without the title," creating
a vicious circle in which "trusteeship justified exploitation ... [which] in turn justified the
trusteeship." Id. at 435 (citing Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384 ("From the Indian's very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government... there
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.")).
234. Id. at 456.
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Determining the terms of the implied social contract by which the Indians
accepted the authority of the United States does not require a vast "leap of
'
imagination."235
The terms can be derived from the initial conditions
under which the contract developed and from the evidence presented by the
resulting treaties in cases where that contract was formalized. The social
contract paradigm does not present a risk of sovereignty confrontations with
the United States because the Indian tribes have accepted the status of
domestic dependent nations.236
The social contract paradigm of the federal-Indian trust relationship
would place an obligation on the federal government to protect Indian tribes
against state encroachment on tribal sovereignty. Chief Justice Marshall
viewed the tribes as "inherently empowered to govern everything that
happened within their territories." 2" Prior to 1987, the Court, when
dealing with the issue of whether the tribe or the state had sovereignty,
started with the presumption that "state action is invalid unless Congress
[has] affirmatively extend[ed] state law into the transaction."238 This
presumption is consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's view. In 1989,
however, the Court completed a shift toward a presumption "favor[ing] the
validity of state law regarding the regulation of non-Indians in Indian
country."239 Under the social contract paradigm of the federal-Indian trust
relationship, the government's promise to protect the tribal right to selfgovernment is one of the contractual terms of the Indian's acquiescence to
the authority of the United States. The social contract paradigm, therefore,
requires a return to the pre-1989 paradigm.
C. APPLICATION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT PARADIGM OF THE FEDERALINDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP.

The trust obligations under the implied contract paradigm differ from
the trust obligations in the context of the "guardian-ward" paradigm.
Unlike obligations based in treaties, they cannot be unilaterally abrogated
because they are part of an ongoing contract. If the government does not

235. Id.
236. See infra Part IV. C. and accompanying text for an explanation of the threshold
inquiry for bringing a claim for a breach of the Government's trust obligation to protect the
tribal right of self-government.
237. William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in America Today, 62 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1987).
238. Deborah A. Geier, Essay: Power and Presumptions; Rules and Rhetoric;

Institutions and Indian Law, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REv. 451.

239. Id. at 482.
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live up to its end of the bargain, its authority over the governed - the tribe
loses its legitimacy.

Congress remains free, under Lone Wolf, to unilaterally abrogate
treaties, but the way in which it does so is reviewable to the extent that it
impacts negatively on the tribal right to self-government. Like Fifth
Amendment analysis, there would be a threshold question when bringing a
claim under the implied contract trust obligation. A determination would
first be made as to whether the alleged violation on the part of the
Government, or an alleged intrusion by a State onto tribal sovereignty,
impinged on an exercise of tribal autonomy which is inconsistent with its
status as a domestic dependant nation.24 If so, the claim would be
dismissed. If the tribe's complaint involves a threat to an exercise of tribal
autonomy consistent with the tribe's status as a domestic dependent nation,
then the Court would apply the same narrowly tailored to a compelling
interest standard it applies to fundamental constitutional rights.
This means that the challenge to the Major Crimes Act brought in
Kagama would be reviewable: exercise of tribal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians in Indian county is compatible with the tribe's status
as a domestic dependant nation. However, the Court might still find that the
Major Crimes Act did not violate the government's obligation to protect
tribal self-government if the Act was narrowly tailored to a compelling
interest.
On the other hand, the General Allotment Act 241 did violate an
obligation to protect tribal self-government by decreasing the tribal land
base without which tribal culture cannot be maintained.242 The Termination Acts2 43 violated the government's trust obligation under the implied
contract by unilaterally ending the trust relationship. The policies behind
these acts have long since been repudiated,2 44 but the acts have not been

240. This would be evaluated in terms of the limitations on sovereignty as set forth by
Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
242. Id.
243. The Termination Acts, a series of legislation enacted during the 1950s, ended the
Federal trust relationship with the specified tribes. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 811-12. For a
discussion of the effect of the Termination Era, see Deloria & Vine, supra note 190, at 1521.
244. The General Allotment Act was repudiated during the Reorganization and SelfGovernment Era, 1928-1945 and formalized in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
Deloria & Vine, supra note 190, at 12-15. The policy underlying the Termination Acts
began to erode in the 1960s, with the beginning of the Self-Determination Era and was
formally repudiated by President Nixon in a message to Congress in July 1970. Id. at 21.
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repealed and their effects are apparent in the presence of non-Indian land
holdings on reservations today.
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indians,245
the Court considered whether the Yakima tribe had the authority to regulate
the use of land held in fee by a non-Indian in an area of the Yakima
reservation where "non-Indian owners... have come to own a substantial
portion of the land." '
The Yakima Indians argued that, under a treaty
granting them "exclusive use and benefit""4 7 of their reservation land and
the power to exclude all white men except those employed by the Indian
Department, they had exclusive power to regulate land use on the reservation.24 The Court rejected the Indians' argument that the effects of the
Allotment Act should not be considered "because it was repudiated in 1934
by the Indian Reorganization Act."249 The majority of the Court found
that the non-Indian land holdings diminished the tribal interest in controlling
the land use and upheld the county's exercise of zoning authority over the
non-Indian held land.250 At the least, the implied-contract trust responsibility would mandate that any diminishment of tribal holding that resulted
from the General Allotment and Termination Acts not be considered in
deciding cases such as Yakima Band.
V. CONCLUSION
I have shown that the trust doctrine, in its current form, does not
include an obligation on the part of the government to promote selfgovernment. Although the Court holds the Executive Branch to a fiduciary
standard if there is statutory language expressing an intent to impose a trust

245. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
246. Id. at 422. This case involved two separate zoning issues, the first involving
Wilkenson, the owner of the land I am discussing, and a second concerning Brendale, the
non-Indian owner of property in an area which was predominantly comprised of trust land.
Id. at 438. The Justices were split as to which property the tribe had the authority to
regulate, with Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy,
delivering the opinion of the Court that the Tribe could not regulate Wilkenson's property,
but dissenting with the decision of the Court that the tribe could regulate Brendale's property.
Id. at 433. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Conner, delivered the opinion of the Court
with regard to Brendale and concurred with regard to Wilkenson. Id. at 444. Justice
Blackmum, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred with regard to Brendale but
dissented with regard to Wilkenson. Id. at 448-68.
247. 492 U.S. at 414-15 (quoting Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951 (1859).
248. Id.at 415 n.l.
249. Id. U.S. at 423.
250. 492 U.S. at 431 (White, J., delivering the opinion of the Court with regard to
Wilkenson), at 446, (Stevens, J., concurring with the judgment with regard to Wilkenson).
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responsibility with regard to a specific area of tribal interest or specific
property or if the government has assumed comprehensive control of Indian
property, the Court has not held Congress to a trust responsibility in its
dealings with the Indians absent a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the use of monetary rather than equitable damages prevents
tribes from reversing the damage to tribal sovereignty as a result of a
violation of the trust doctrine.
I then suggested that a stronger paradigm of the trust doctrine based on
social contract theory could strengthen the efficacy of the trust doctrine in
protecting tribal autonomy. The resulting social contract paradigm of the
trust doctrine is based on that concept that the contractual limitations on the
power of the United States over Indian inherent in an implied contract
between the United States and the Indian Nations are equivalent to
Constitutional rights. The paradigm draws on Chief Justice Marshall's
account of the Indian understanding of the obligations accepted by the
United States in return for tribal acquiescence to the authority of the United
States which limited the right of the tribes to defend themselves against
incursions onto their land. These obligations include the duty to protect the
tribes from incursions onto their land, which entails the duty to protect the
tribal right to self-government.
Because the social contract paradigm is not connected to the plenary
power doctrine, it may be a way to hold Congress to a trust obligation in its
dealings with Indian affairs without overruling Lone Wolf

